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A Very British Coup: Lessons from the draft UK Regulations for Cubesats. 
 
By: Christopher J. Newman and Michael J. Listner 
 
Introduction 
 
From an apparent standing start in the early years of the 21st Century, the United 
Kingdom has recently embraced the challenges of diversifying its economy by 
investing heavily in space activity. One of the perceived obstacles to developing 
this area of growth was the regulatory framework enshrined within the Outer 
Space Act 1986 was overly burdensome on small companies. Recognising this, 
the UK Space Agency has recently promulgated draft recommendations for 
changes to the regulatory framework governing Cubesats.1 These proposals if 
enacted, will trim much of the unnecessary administration and repetition from the 
process of obtaining a licence whilst retaining enough regulation to effectively 
discharge the UK governmentÕs responsibility under the Outer Space Treaty 
1967.  
 
This discussion does not attempt to evaluate the technical or engineering 
implications of the Cubesat phenomenon nor it does not attempt to critique the 
draft UK recommendations from that perspective. Instead, this discussion will 
focus on the legal and regulatory efficacy of the proposals. This article will 
critically evaluate the proposed UK Cubesat regulations in the context of the 
current UK attempts to expand its share of the world space economy. Crucially, 
however, this discussion will also look beyond the UK and explore the role of 
regulation more broadly within the small satellite industry. The light touch solution 
proposed by the British will be compared and contrasted to the current regulation 
employed by the United States. It will be discussed how the British approach 
might benefit the current U.S. system and influence other state actors as well as 
the broader international community. 
 
The UK Space Economy: Setting the context for reform 
 
The economic imperative for a revised legislative approach can be found in the 
ÔCase for SpaceÕ study commissioned by the UK Space Agency, and conducted 
by London Economics2. This report found the UK space economy had trebled in 
real terms since the turn of the century. In 2012/13 it was valued at an aggregate 
turnover of £11.8bn (around $18.5bn) with a compound annual growth rate of 
8.6% since 2008/93. Closer examination of these figures shows the vast majority 
of this turnover is accounted for by the direct to home (so called Satellite) 
television market4. Space manufacturing accounts for just under a £1bn ($1.5bn) 
of the UK space economy and it is in this area government and private industry 
are looking to expand.  
 
The UK Innovation and Growth Strategy (IGS), published in 2010 set a target of 
growing the UKÕs share of the global space market to 10% by 20305. Such a 
target may appear ambitious given the relatively late entry in the arena of space 
activity. It is, however, not without substance. Satellite manufacturers such as 
Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL) and Airbus Defence and Space have 
recently signed high profile contracts to produce small satellite constellations 
covering a wide range of applications6. Recent trade missions to Asia7 and 
America8 have sought to develop the UK space market share. The mission to 
America focused specifically on fostering links between nine small satellite 
startup companies to counterparts in the US. In addition to all of this commercial 
activity, is the prospect of the UK finally entering the sphere of human spaceflight 
and the attendant domestic attention this will bring to nascent UK space 
ambitions.  
 
Regulation in the UK: The Outer Space Act 1986 
 
Despite being the worldÕs third spacefaring nation with the launch of Ariel-19, the 
UK was late in realizing the potential of space activity to provide sustained 
economic benefit. It is now, however, wasting no time in trying to cultivate 
commercial space opportunities. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that the 
underpinning regulatory regime has remained untouched for nearly 30 years. The 
legal basis for all space activity carried out by the United Kingdom is to be found 
in the Outer Space Act 1986. This piece of primary legislation is the way in which 
the UK Government discharges its obligations under the Outer Space Treaty 
1967. The Act establishes a regime of regulation to which all entities under its 
jurisdiction must comply if connected with space activity in the UK and confers 
the power to licence space activities upon the Secretary of State10. 
 
The regulatory burden that this licensing requirement imposes upon (especially 
but not exclusively) small space startups is considerable. Section 4 of the 1986 
Act provides the conditions under which a licence will be granted. A licence will 
not be granted unless the Secretary of State (via the UK Space Agency regulator) 
is satisfied the activities authorized will not jeopardize public health11, will be 
consistent with the international obligations of the UK12 and will not impair the 
national security of the UK13. The grant of a licence, in practice involves an 
assessment process during which there will be a financial, safety and 
environmental assessment of the application14. Recognised as being Ôhigh costÕ 
this process looks back over the development of the project and also seeks to 
look forward, assessing potential areas of risk and liability arising from the 
proposed activity. Section 5 of the 1986 Act states that the grant of a licence is 
conditional on the requirement that the licensee prevents the contamination of 
outer space, prevents adverse changes in the environment of the Earth and 
avoids interference with the activities of others in the peaceful exploration and 
use of outer space. In the consultation document first promulgated in June 2015, 
the UK Space Agency recognized the current regulatory regime is not well suited 
to deal with Cubesats. It is against the backdrop of this concern the UK Space 
Agency has made recommendations to reform the regulations regarding the 
licensing of Cubesats. 
 
Regulating Cubesats: The traffic light approach 
 
In redrafting the regulations, the UK Space Agency has had to balance the 
regulatory duties in respect of risk and liability with need to fully explore the 
undoubted economic potential offered by low cost, modular Cubesat platforms. 
The stated aim of the consultation into the specifics of Cubesat regulation is to: 
 
ÒÉ evaluate the risk presented to, and posed by, such systems and 
consider how its regulatory approach might be tailored for Cubesat 
systems. Recognising the common aspects of such missions, there is an 
opportunity for the UK Space Agency to exploit a range of pre-determined 
technical assessments and associated likely regulatory outcomes for a 
range of likely Cubesat systems, presented in the form of a traffic light 
system (GREEN = low risk, AMBER = medium risk- may require further 
consideration such as evaluation of safety- critical systems, RED = high 
risk- likely to present unacceptable hazard to operational population 
which cannot be mitigated cost-effectively.)Ó15 
 
For those within the commercial sector, these outcomes could, at the discretion 
of the regulator, be Ôreflected in the need for insurance and other requirements 
normally included in the licenseÕ. This points to two key characteristics of the new 
Cubesat regime. First, the regulators are seeking to develop a system with a 
number of harmonized elements that can be used to speed up the application 
and reduce costs. Second, rather than creating blanket immunity from regulation 
for Cubesat missions, the UK Space Agency recognizes the need for some form 
of ongoing regulatory oversight in this area.  
 
The standardized nature of Cubesat systems has enabled the consultation to 
break down the risks posed by any Cubesat mission into three fundamental 
elements: the launch system, platform characteristics and the orbit into which the 
Cubesat will be inserted16. From this, the report outlines eight recommendations 
designed to facilitate the introduction of a traffic light system, providing a matrix 
of the three elements above, which will be ÔGreenÕ in terms of licensing 
requirements. As the report states: ÔThis is analogous to but not equivalent to 
certification of tried and trusted systemsÕ. Recommendation 7 seeks to promote 
the creation of a series of criteria that correspond to the Green evaluation for 
each element of the mission outlined above17. In effect, this traffic light system 
will enable developers to produce Cubesat platforms that, upon successful 
mapping to the Green rating, will be able to be certified in a streamlined, 
harmonized process.  
 
The first two recommendations are focused towards the launch system and are 
relatively straightforward. By virtue of Articles III and IV of the Liability Convention 
1972 (which themselves build on Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty 1967), a 
state attracts absolute liablity for compensation for damage caused by a space 
object either on the surface of the Earth or to an aircraft in flight (as opposed to 
fault based liability for damaged caused to other space objects in orbit). Given 
the small mass of a Cubesat, it is unlikely any elements reentering from orbit 
would survive. The UK Space agency therefore recognises that absolute liability 
for damage caused by a Cubesat is likely to be limited to the launch phase of the 
mission. From a regulatory perspective, ensuring the use of recognised launch 
providers can largely discharge the burden of absolute liability, which rests upon 
the state. Using such providers means launch insurance (and in-orbit liability 
cover for a year) will usually be provided as part of the launch contract18.   
 
Recommendation 1 requires an assessment of Cubesat launch 
systems/scenarios, the UK Space Agency website to identify those 
launchers/situations which would attract a Green rating under particular 
conditions19. Recommendation 2 looks to build on this and reuse launch vehicle 
specific data and information regarding the characteristics of the launch 
systems. This would then provide evidence for potential customers of both 
mission assurance and safety assurance with only incremental changes to the 
operation of a launcher needing to be reassessed. Both of these 
recommendations are sensible and, if enacted, there is little doubt they would 
Ôreduce the burden on the licence applicant and the regulatory authority.Õ20 
 
The platform considerations for Cubesat regulation are, for the most part, also 
rooted in common sense and appear to be relatively uncontroversial. The report 
identifies that Cubesats differ from other satellite systems in they follow 
standardized approaches for many aspects of the mission. Accordingly, 
Recommendation 3 specifies Ôapplicable international standards should be 
employed to specify those standard aspects of Cubesats platforms that can 
provide safety assurances about the intrinsic hazards presented by the Cubesat 
satellite and its subsystems to other space systemsÕ21. Recommendation 5 
recognises there will be a great deal of this commonality inherent when dealing 
with constellations of Cubesats and proposes such sets of satellites could be 
collectively authorized under a single licence fee. Given that Ôsmallsat 
constellations are, for now, the wave of the future for the space industryÕ22, 
adopting this recommendation represents a crucial step forward in unburdening 
the space manufacturing industry of oppressive regulation.  
 
Environmental Considerations: Managing and Encouraging Sustainable Growth  
 
The recent proliferation of Cubesat constellations has, however, led to concerns 
being voiced regarding the dangers of congestion in space and the resultant 
issues in relation to cleaning up orbital debris. This is a crucial area of Cubesat 
regulation as there is a lingering perception they represent an increasing menace 
to operations in low Earth orbit23. In respect of regulation it is almost axiomatic to 
aver the Outer Space Treaty does not specifically address the issue of orbital 
debris. This, however, merely reflects the modern predilection of states to 
subscribe to more agile, non-binding guidelines24. Given the increasing profile of 
the danger posed to current and future space activity from orbital debris, this is 
an area that a regulator would neglect at their peril. Recommendations 4 and 6 
are aimed squarely at ensuring the regulatory role of the UK Space Agency is 
fully discharging its duties in respect of the long-term sustainability of space. 
Recommendation 4 can be categorized as an attempt at monitoring the overall 
volume of Cubesats licensed Ôboth in terms of the number on a particular launch 
and the overall constellation involved, in terms of the collision risks posed to 
other orbital systems both during and after the operational phase of the mission, 
and the potential impact on long term sustainability of the orbital environmentÕ25. 
It has been noted that a Cubesat constellation can significantly increase the 
number and frequency of conjunctions when compared with a monolithic 
satellites26. Recommendation 4 is somewhat opaque as to when a constellation 
may be unduly onerous upon the space environment. It may be, therefore, this is 
intended to work in harness with the specific measures outlined in 
Recommendation 6. 
Simulations have shown that given their ubiquity and the likelihood of their 
increased use, Cubesats will be inevitably be responsible for millions of 
additional conjunctions, which have the potential to lead to collisions27. Serving to 
satisfy UN Debris Mitigation Guideline 628, Recommendation 6 seeks to limit the 
longer-term presence of Cubesats in LEO once they have ended their useful life. 
The recommendation looks to prohibit Cubesats without propulsive capability 
from being injected into orbits with a natural decay of 25 years. Where a mission 
does require a Cubesat to be inserted into an orbit with a natural decay beyond 
the 25-year limit, there must sufficient reliability and fuel or a proven onboard 
disposal system to enable the cubesat to deorbit to a lower disposal altitude that 
will comply with the 25-year rule. Whilst these are the irreducible minima of what 
might be expected, it could be argued given the dramatic increase in the Cubesat 
population (which these regulations are, after all, seeking to bring about) these 
regulations could actually be more robust in terms of their requirements. 
Incentivizing low perigee orbits so, where necessary Cubesats deorbit within 5 
years of end of life, prompting constellations to spread perigee altitude to 
remove the burden on specific orbits and encouraging measures to reduce 
tracking uncertainty would serve to tackle orbital congestion29 and demonstrate 
the UK regulators are committed to ensuring space sustainability.30  
 
Waiving Insurance: The key to unlocking the sector? 
 
Crucially, however, it is the final recommendation is potentially the most far 
reaching. In recognizing the OSA regulatory regime is not conducive to growth 
within the Cubesat industry, the unspoken central issue for much of the report is 
not technical but economic. The expense of the application process is only part 
of the story. The main criticism of the 1986 Act is reserved for the requirement 
under section 10. This imposes an obligation upon all applicants (irrespective of 
the nature of the project) to indemnify the government fully against any third party 
liability (TPL) claims brought as a result of damage or loss arising out of 
activities. Currently, this represents unlimited liability on licensees and, according 
to one observer Ôthe concept of Òunlimited liabilityÓ offers little financial certainty 
when fund raising and, compared with other space faring nations, poses a 
competitive disadvantage to UK operators.Õ31 This concern chimed with the view 
of the Regulatory Policy Committee, which stated Ôthe treatment of contingent 
liabilities under the Act is inconsistent with practice in other space faring nations 
and in other UK sectors that have comparable contingent liabilities.Õ32  
 
Accordingly, from October 1st 2015, licenses for space activity granted under the 
1986 Act now include a cap on the unlimited liability. Whilst a risk assessment will 
be performed for each new licence application to determine the appropriate 
liability cap, it is anticipated the majority of cases the cap will be set at !60 million 
($67 million)33. The cap will not apply automatically to existing licenses; however, 
there is provision for the cap to be applied to existing satellites upon request to 
the UK Space Agency. According to a report commissioned by Innovate UK, when 
this reform occurs, the UK regulatory regime will be on a similar level to other 
players in the space industry34. Whilst an obvious improvement in the commercial 
environment, there are two critical issues that need considering. First, the 1986 
Act retains the requirement that TPL insurance is needed for all aspects of the 
mission, including on-orbit TPL insurance, whereas most other countries require 
TPL insurance for launch only. Second, the 1986 Act requires TPL insurance for 
all aspects of the mission, irrespective of the size and expense of the satellite.  
 
Despite the aforementioned desire to empower the space manufacturing sector, 
it is clear the ongoing licensing requirement for TPL insurance, (notwithstanding 
the cap at !60 million, including on-orbit coverage) poses a challenge to 
precisely the sort of SME space startup that the IGS is seeking to encourage. 
Assuming a premium of 0.1% of the rate covered, the TPL insurance requirement 
would typically see a small startup having to pay !60k for a Cubesat may well 
have only cost less than that amount to manufacture. This means many SME 
space startups looking to utilize Cubesats are stillborn.  
 
Any attempt to reform the regulation of Cubesats clearly needed to address this 
issue. Accordingly, Recommendation 8, states that the UK Space Agency should 
conduct a financial impact assessment examining the benefit to the Cubesat 
industry of waiving the TPL insurance requirement for Cubesat missions judged 
not to expose the UK to potential in-orbit liability. The example given within the 
report was of a Cubesat launched into a low orbit with a lifetime of 5 years. Given 
this is well below the 25-year limit and in accordance with best practice, it is 
unlikely the UK would be liable on the fault basis associated with on-orbit 
collisions. In such circumstances the requirement for TPL insurance could be 
waived. The report goes on to state ÔAs it is often argued that third party liability 
insurance is a major barrier to entry for some Cubesat operators, this measure in 
itself could facilitate the emergence of new actors within the Cubesat market.Õ35 
It is clear the UK Space Agency is reluctant to introduce a blanket waiver for 
Cubesats. Given the aforementioned tension between the regulatory role and the 
need to champion the emerging Cubesat industry this is perhaps not surprising. 
But it has already been identified that the purchase of on-going TPL insurance 
presents UK startups with a disadvantage. The requirement of a financial impact 
assessment on this will provide the policy impetus within Government to lessen 
this advantage. Given the choice of traffic light regulation for Cubesat, a blanket 
waiver was never a realistic prospect, nor is it necessarily desirable. A regulatory 
framework needs flexibility and rather than have a waiver with the risk some 
missions may be refused a license because of their risk, a discretionary waiver 
for low risk missions seems a sensible way to proceed. The litmus test for 
success will not be in the granting of the waiver, but whether the waiver actually 
does serve to unshackle the nascent space-manufacturing base within the UK. 
 
A Comparative View and Possible Lessons for Other Actors.  
 
As demonstrated above, the UK recommendations to abridge the regulatory 
structure for cubesats represents a centralized, coordinated effort to address 
the growing proliferation of commercial cubesats. To the extent that the 
proposed UK regulatory structure is designed to streamline the approval process 
for cubesats, a comparative look at the regulatory structure the United States 
employs to approve cubesats appears to already meet that end.  The United 
States boasts the largest contingent of commercial cubesat operators, but lacks 
a centralized system like the proposed UK regulatory structure to license and 
regulate cubesats.  This lack of a centralized authority stems not from a lack of 
attention to growing use of cubesats, but rather it is a result of national space 
policy. Specifically, the current National Space Policy states as one of its 
principals that: 
 
"A robust and competitive commercial space sector is vital to continued 
progress in space.  The United States is committed to encouraging and 
facilitating the growth of a U.S. commercial space sector that supports 
U.S. needs, is globally competitive, and advances U.S. leadership in the 
generation of new markets and innovation-driven entrepreneurship."36 
 
The National Space Policy goes on to direct U.S agencies to: 
 
"Minimize, as much as possible, the regulatory burden for commercial 
space activities and ensure that the regulatory environment for licensing 
space activities is timely and responsive..."37 
 
The National Space Policy follows a similar tenor of its predecessors starting 
with the Reagan National Space Policy of 1982, which first facilitated 
commercial space activities.  Since this inception of the concept, national space 
policy has directed regulation be subordinated to technological and commercial 
development, including the development and deployment of cubesats by the 
commercial sector.  That is not to say cubesat regulation is non-existent.  Both 
the United States and the UK have an international legal responsibility under 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty for activities of private and commercial 
actors under their respective jurisdictions and as mentioned beforehand retain 
liability for those actors pursuant to Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and by 
extension Articles III and IV of the Liability Convention.   
 
As an extension of that responsibility Congress passed the Commercial Space 
Launch Act of 1984, which evolved into the current statutory body of law under 51 
U.S.C. ¤¤ 50101-51105 and specifically the authority of the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) to issue commercial launch licenses under 51 U.S.C. ¤¤ 
50901-50923 and the subsequent regulations under 14 CFR ¤¤ 400.1 - 401.5.  
Nevertheless, the statutory and regulatory authority granted to issue launch 
licenses under these sections is broad and not specific to any particular vehicle 
or payload, including cubesats.   Private/commercial cubesats within the United 
States unlike the proposed UK cubesat regulations are regulated and licensed in 
a decentralized manner based on function by the executive agency with the 
statutory jurisdiction to administer that function.  
 
For instance, the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to 51 U.S.C. ¤ 60121 is 
authorized to license private sector parties to operate private remote sensing 
space systems for such period as the Secretary may specify and in accordance 
with the provisions of United States law.  This authority is delegated by the 
Secretary of Commerce to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Agency (NOAA) and requires any private entity under the jurisdiction of the United 
States to obtain a license to operate a private remote-sensing system, which 
includes a private/commercial cubesat that will employ a remote-sensing 
capability. 
 
To obtain and maintain an operating license from NOAA, a cubesat operator of a 
remote-sensing platform must comply with 51 U.S.C. ¤ 60122(b) and 15 CFR 
960.11, which covers collection and dissemination of remote sensing data and 
orbital debris mitigation, to include operating the system in such manner as to 
preserve the national security of the United States and to observe the 
international obligations of the United States; 38  making available to the 
government of any country (including the United States) unenhanced data 
collected by the system concerning the territory under the jurisdiction of such 
government as soon as such data are available and on reasonable terms and 
conditions; make unenhanced data available to NOAA; upon termination of 
operations under the license, make disposition of any satellites in space in a 
manner satisfactory to orbital debris mitigation guidelines; furnishing NOAA with 
complete orbit and data collection characteristics of the system, and 
immediately inform NOAA of any deviation; and notifying NOAA of any significant 
or substantial agreement the licensee intends to enter with a foreign nation, 
entity, or consortium involving foreign nations or entities.39 
 
Conversely, private cubesats whose purpose involves the use of radio spectrum 
are required to comply with regulations of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC).  Until recently, most of the FCC regulations associated with 
cubesats related to the amateur radio service under 47 CFR 97.207 where a 
permitted amateur radio licensee may operate a "space station" operating within 
authorized frequencies.40  It is noteworthy the permit of a cubesat for amateur 
operations is not a license per se, but rather a permission to an FCC licensed 
amateur to operate a "space station" (cubesat).   
 
The license grantee of permission for operation of cubesat must comply with 47 
CFR 97.207(g), which is heavily focused on orbital debris mitigation, and requires 
the permit holder to make written notifications to the international branch of the 
FCC to make several statements to include: that the space station licensee has 
assessed and limited the amount of debris released in a planned manner during 
normal operations, and has assessed and limited the probability of the space 
station becoming a source of debris by collisions with small debris or meteoroids 
that could cause loss of control and prevent post-mission disposal; that the 
space station licensee has assessed and limited the probability of accidental 
explosions during and after completion of mission operations;41 that the space 
station licensee has assessed and limited the probability of the space station 
becoming a source of debris by collisions with large debris or other operational 
space stations; provide a detailed post-mission disposal plan for the space 
station at end of life, including the quantity of fuel-if any-that will be reserved for 
post-mission disposal maneuvers; and if any material item described in the 
notification changes before launch, which mandates that a replacement pre-
space notification be filed with the International Bureau of the FCC no later than 
90 days before integration of the space station into the launch vehicle.  
  
As has been noted already, Cubesats are becoming more commonplace in the 
commercial sector, especially with proposed cubesat constellations such as 
OneWeb.  The FCC regulates commercial satellites and by extension cubesats 
through existing federal regulations, including 47 CFR ¤¤ 25.101 - 25.701, which 
regulates satellite communications and specifically 47 CFR ¤¤ 25.140 - 25.149, 
which focuses on technical standards and operations.  The FCC addresses 
orbital debris mitigation for commercial satellites and cubesats under 47 CFR ¤ 
25.114(d)(14) and requires operators to provide a description of the design and 
operational strategies that will be used to mitigate orbital debris, which are 
similar to the requirements of amateur-class cubesats under 47 CFR 
97.207(g).42   
 
Private/commercial cubesats will continue to proliferate and occupy a greater 
portion of the radio spectrum, which is prompting calls for more coordination in 
applying for and entering frequency information with the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU).43  This is one potential area where the FCC 
could amend its regulations regarding cubesats to ensure compliance with ITU 
mandates and avoid future spectrum interference.  For the time being cubesat 
regulation in the United States will follow the lead of the National Space Policy 
and regulation will remain decentralized and utilize the existing regulatory 
framework while still providing a permissive regulatory environment as 
envisioned by the proposed UK cubesat regulations.  Even though cubesat 
regulations are decentralized in the United States, they do mirror and address 
some if not all of the concerns relevant to the proposed UK regulations, and in 
essence parallel each other even though the proposed UK regulations are 
focused to one agency and cubesat regulation within the United States is spread 
across multiple agencies.   
 
Overreaching is the United States' obligations under Article VI of the OST 1967, 
which may require it to revisit the decentralized approach to cubesat regulation 
in the future.44  As private, commercial use of cubesats becomes more prolific 
and certain orbits become saturated, the United States may have to reconsider 
its approach and designate one agency to issue a license to a private operator 
and require that agency to coordinate with other agencies such as NOAA, the 
FCC and other agencies as necessary.  Complicit with centralization could be 
standard regulations and requirements for cubesats consistent with the 
proposed UK regulations. It is ironic that the approach of the UK (based as it is on 
relatively recent engagement in space activity), could well serve as a model for 
the United States.  Whether such a centralized approach is necessary or 
desirable is contingent on the tone of future national space policy, Congressional 
legislation, and subsequent regulation.  However, unless there is strong 
international pressure and presuming the treatment of commercial space activity 
vis-a-vis national space policy remains relatively unchanged, the United States 
will resist the centralized approach taken by the proposed UK regulations. 
Instead they will allow the responsible agencies to modify their regulations to 
address the growing cubesat population and future space traffic management 
and the liability associated with it.45 
 
Apart from the regulatory approach for cubesats used by the United States, 
emerging space-faring nations might see cubesats as an economical means to 
join the commercial space race.  If that is the case, the proposed UK cubesat 
regulations would be an attractive model for a regulatory scheme to meet their 
respective obligations under the Outer Space Treaty and other international 
accords they are party to and provide a permissive regulatory environment to 
facilitate commercial cubesat development.  Consequently, the UK is sure to 
have an international audience observing the implementation and enforcement 
of the proposed regulatory structure and might find itself as the focal point of 
private cubesat regulation much in the way the United States is the focal point for 
the creation of the legal and regulatory regime for commercial launch and 
spaceflight. 
 
Beyond serving as a model for national regulatory schemes, the proposed UK 
regulations might also form the basis of a non-binding international norm for 
cubesats.  As a result, the UK's domestic approach to cubesats might bring about 
a bottom-up rule that is adopted as an international non-binding norm for other 
nations to emulate if not adopt outright much in the same way that NASA's Orbital 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines have been adopted by the United Nations and 
subsequently state actors.  To that end, the UK might keep in mind not only other 
interested nations will be looking over their shoulder but the international 
community as well. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Examining the UK and the United States approach in a side-by-side fashion is 
illuminating, illustrating the different directions taken by the two states in respect 
of managing their obligations under the Outer Space Treaty. The UK Space 
Agency is part cheerleader, part regulator and, as such fulfils roles undertaken by 
both NOAA and the FCC, albeit on a much smaller scale. Given the relatively late 
entry into space manufacturing, the UK regulatory model is much more a product 
of revolution rather than the evolution that has emerged in the United States. As 
identified above, the move to a centralized, light-touch regulatory model in the 
United States would provide a number of key advantages at a relatively low cost 
and with little practical intrusive impact. Such an approach would not be 
incompatible with the National Space Policy, serve to act as a focal point for the 
developing Cubesat industry and future-proof the United States from regulatory 
intrusion at a later date.  That's not to say that the United States should follow the 
regulatory lead of the UK, but its policy, legislative and regulatory organs should 
keep an open mind to a different approach to cubesat regulation if the current 
system proves unmanageable. 
 
Whilst the regulations are only in draft form at the moment, there is little doubt 
that a consultation with UK stakeholders will yield a positive response. Properly 
implemented, the UK's proposed cubesat regulations should provide a conducive 
base for private/commercial cubesat development in the UK.  Notwithstanding 
the decentralized approach of the United States, (and given the increased 
engagement of the UK with ESA and other international space actors), the 
proposed UK regulatory scheme will stand on its own and provide a model for 
other state actors seeking to implement their own domestic cubesat regulatory 
scheme. 
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